Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption is a promising mechanism with fine-grained access control for cloud storage system. However, there is a long-lasting problem of key abuse that a user may share its decryption key and a semi-honest authority may illegally issue decryption keys for unauthorized users for profits. To address this problem, we propose an accountable ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme. In our construction, there are two authorities to issue keys for users, but they cannot decrypt any ciphertexts without collusion. A shared key can be effectively traced, and if the traced identity claims that it is innocent, an auditor can publicly audit who will be responsible for the shared key. Compared with existing accountable ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption schemes, the proposed scheme is more practical from the two aspects: (1) a user can normally request for a decryption key along with a short signature, and no additional interaction between users and authorities is needed; and (2) the complexity of tracing a masked secret key is reduced to jUj exponent computation, where jUj denotes the number of users in the system. At last, we give the security and experimental analysis.
Introduction
Cloud storage is one of the most important services of cloud computing. More and more individuals (enterprises) are moving their private data to the cloud either for ease of sharing or for cost saving. While people enjoy the convenience of this new information technology (IT) architecture, their concerns about data security and privacy also arise.
Naturally, people want their sensitive data only accessible to authorized users. However, the cloud is semitrusted, it cannot provide a fully trusted data access control service. To achieve access control on untrusted cloud servers, the data owner usually needs to encrypt the data before outsourcing, and only users holding decryption keys can recover the data. Traditional encryption schemes are no longer applicable to cloud systems, because there 1 will be multiple encrypted copies of the same data for users with different keys and this will incur high computation overhead for the data owner and high storage overhead for the cloud.
Attribute-based Encryption (ABE), introduced by Sahai and Waters, 1 is a suitable solution for finegrained access control in cloud storage systems. Generally, ABE can be classified into two main types: 2 (1) key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE): a user's secret key is related to an access policy, while a ciphertext is labeled by a set of attributes; (2) ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE): a ciphertext is associated with an access policy, while the user's decryption key is identified with a set of descriptive attributes.
In CP-ABE scheme, an authority manages the attribute universe and is responsible for issuing secret key for users according to attributes. The data owner defines an access policy and encrypts data under the access policy. A user can decrypt the ciphertexts if and only if the attributes related to its secret key satisfy the access policies in ciphertexts.
A motivating story
A data owner employs a cloud storage system and outsources its data after encrypting the data under access policy A _ fB^Cg. Each user in the system is assigned with some attributes, such as Alice is assigned with attributes A, B and C; Bob with C; and Ross with B and C. An authority (AA) will issue keys for each user according their attributes. Because fA, B, Cg and fB, Cg satisfy the access policy over the outsourced data, and Alice and Ross can decrypt these ciphertexts and get access to the sensitive data stored in the cloud. Thus, CP-ABE is quite suitable for cloud storage scenario.
However, in the CP-ABE system the secret key is related to attributes instead of identity, that is, users may have the same decryption privilege. In the above example, Alice and Ross have the same decryption privilege according to {B, C}. Then, a malicious user (e.g. Ross) is willing to share its secret key for profits without worrying about exposure because Alice has the same key. Thus, there should be a method to trace the owner of a shared secret key, that is, the CP-ABE system should support the property of traceability.
Furthermore, if the malicious user (e.g. Alice) is traced as the traitor (who shares her decryption key) but claims to be framed by the authority in the system, this case is possible in single authority CP-ABE system. There is only one authority that issues secret keys for all users, the authority can illegally generate arbitrary secret keys, and distribute it to an illegal user while this secret key may be associated with an honest user. For example, the authority generates a decryption key associated with Alice, and shares this key to Evil who is unauthorized. Then how to judge whether Alice is framed or not? If a user is traced to be malicious the CP-ABE system should provide accountability, that is, it is necessary to provide a method that enables an auditor to judge whether a traced user is innocent or not.
Related works
Cloud computing, such as computation model 3, 4 and application of blockchain 5 to cloud computing, is still an interesting and attractive research field. As to secure cloud storage, many ABE schemes [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] aiming at better efficiency, security and expressiveness have been proposed.
As to ABE with white-box traceability which takes a well-formed decryption key as input, Li et al. 16 gave an accountable ABE supporting AND gate with wildcards access policy. However, it cannot achieve traceability as mentioned in Yu et al. 17 Liu et al. 18 proposed a traceable CP-ABE supporting any monotone access structures, Ning et al. 19 proposed a traceable CP-ABE scheme supporting large universe, a fully secure traceable CP-ABE scheme. 20 As to ABE with accountability, Ning et al. 21 proposed an accountable ABE supporting traceability and public auditing. The public auditing in scheme given by Ning et al. 21 is based on zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (ZK-POK) of a random. However, if there is only one authority and there is not a public verifiable binding between the random and user's identity, the authority still can generate an illegal secret key related to another random for an unauthorized user.
Yu et al. 17 proposed an traceable ABE supporting public verifiability which fails to support accountability owing to the fact that there is only one authority who knows secret keys of all users. Then, Yu et al. 22 proposed an accountable ABE based on two authorities, neither of whom can generate a valid secret key. However, in the scheme given by Yu et al., 22 the user needs two steps of interaction with the two authorities during the key generation phase. This is more complicated than traditional ABE schemes from the view of users. Furthermore, the malicious user can change the number of elements in secret keys before sharing them which will make the identity of the secret key more complicated to trace.
The concrete comparison of features with related works [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] is shown in Table 1 . According to Table 1 , both the proposed traceable and undeniable ciphertextpolicy attribute-based encryption (tuCP-ABE) scheme and the scheme by Yu et al. 22 can achieve accountability. However, the scheme by Yu et al. 22 needs an additional interaction with the two authorities during the key generation phase, and Table 2 shows that it needs to compute additional 2jUj bilinear maps to trace a masked key where jUj denotes the number of users in the system. It is a heavy workload to trace a masked key when there are many users in the system.
Besides white-box traceability, there is another practical property called black-box traceability which takes a decryption device as input. The black-box device will hide the decryption key and the black-box trace algorithm should find the identity of decryption key that has been used in constructing the decryption device. Li et al. 10 proposed a black-box traceable ABE supporting AND gate with wildcards access policy. Liu et al. 23 proposed a black-box traceable CP-ABE system which supports any monotone access structures, and Liu et al. 24 gave a full secure blackbox traceable CP-ABE system based on prime order groups, Ning et al. 25 proposed a black-box traceable CP-ABE scheme with shorter ciphertexts, and there are some researches on traceable CP-ABE in fog computing, 26, 27 and auditable s-time outsourced CP-ABE 28 which limits that users can enjoy access privilege at most s times.
Our results
In this article, we investigate the key abuse problem and further propose a tuCP-ABE. To achieve traceability, the identity information of key owner is signed by the authority and inserted into the user's secret key as a necessary part for successful decryption. To achieve accountability, two authorities are applied to avoid key escrow that neither of the two authorities knows the user's secret key and a short signature of the user is used to achieve nonrepudiation. The main features of tuCP-ABE are as follows.
Practical key generation: In the decryption key generation algorithm of the scheme given by Yu et al., 22 the authorities, central authority (CA) and outsourcing authority (OA) need to generate a one-time K and send to user, and then the user signs a signature of K and sends to CA which will introduce an additional interaction. To improve efficiency, the user (instead of authorities) will select a one-time random r U and sign a signature of r U , and no additional interactions between a user and authorities is needed. This is more practical than that in scheme given by Yu et al., 22 where the user will sign a short signature for a received element by interacting with authorities. Efficient traceability: If the user shares its secret key without a mask, the identity of a shared secret key in our tuCP-ABE can be easily traced with public verifiability because the identity is a part of shared key. Else, if the user shares a masked secret key, the CA will do jUj times exponent computations to trace the identity information related to a shared key, where jUj denotes the number of users in system. This is more efficient than that in scheme given by Yu et al. 22 which needs 2jUj computations of bilinear maps. Accountability: The auditing in scheme given by Ning et al. 21 is based on t id = (c=t), where c is a random chosen by the authority and t is a random chosen by the user. The authority still can illegally generate a decryption key that is related to an identity who never requests a secret key and can decrypt arbitrary ciphertexts. The essence of these shortcomings is that there is not a public verifiable binding between the random and the user's identity. Thus, we introduce a short signature scheme, and the user will sign a signature for the one-time random r U . Based on one-time random r U and unforgeability of the signature, both CA and OA cannot generate a secret key separately, and cannot decrypt any ciphertexts without collusion, that is, the scheme is without key escrow. Besides traceability, an auditor can public audit whether a user is malicious or innocent, that is, the proposed tuCP-ABE scheme can support accountability. Public auditing: Note that the schemein Ning et al. 21 is privately auditable, only a fully trusted auditor can run the audit procedure because the auditor needs know the whole secret key of user. In the proposed tuCP-ABE, the user only needs to submit a part of the decryption key to the auditor. The auditor can publicly verify the validness of the submitted key, and the auditor cannot decrypt any ciphertexts using the received key.
Organization
Section ''Background'' introduces some preliminaries, including the bilinear map and related assumptions. Section ''Accountable CP-ABE'' gives the formal definition of the tuCP-ABE and its security model. The main construction of tuCP-ABE is given in section ''The concrete tuCP-ABE scheme.'' Section ''Security and performance analysis'' presents the security proof and the performance analysis. Finally, section ''Conclusion'' presents a brief conclusion and foresees our future work.
Background
Definition 1 Bilinear maps. G is a prime-order bilinear groups generator which takes a security parameter l as input and outputs prime-order bilinear groups (G, G T , e, p), where p is a prime, G, G T are two cyclic groups of order p and e : G 3 G ! G T is a bilinear maps such that (1) bilinearity: 8g, h 2 G and a, b 2 Z p , we have e(g a , h b ) = e(g, h) ab ; (2) mon-degeneracy: 9g 2 G such that e(g, g) has order p in G T ; and (3) computability: e can be efficiently computed.
Definition 2
Discrete logarithm problem. Inputting g a , where g 2 G, a2 R Z Ã p , the discrete logarithm (DL) problem is to compute a.
Assumption 1
DL assumption. The advantage of an algorithm A in solving the DL problem is defined to be Adv DL (A) = Pr½A(g, g a ) = a : g, g a R G. We say that G satisfies the DL assumption if Adv DL (A) is a negligible function of security parameter l for any polynomial algorithm A.
Definition 3
Decisional q parallel-BDHE problem.
Assumption 2
Decisional q parallel-BDHE assumption. The advantage of an algorithm A in solving the decisional q parallel-BDHE problem is defined to be Adv DBDH (A) = jPr½A(s * , e(g, g)
, R) = 1j. We say that G satisfies the decisional q parallel-BDHE assumption if Adv DBDH (A) is a negligible function of security parameter l for any polynomial algorithm A.
Accountable CP-ABE

Definition
The traceable and undeniable CP-ABE, denoted by tuCP-ABE in brief, consists of 10 polynomial-time algorithms.
GlobalSetup(l) ! (GPP):
The global setup algorithm, takes in the security parameter l, and outputs the global public parameters GPP. CASetup(l) ! (P CA , MSK CA ): The CA setup algorithm, takes in global public parameters GPP, outputs the public key P CA of CA, CA' secret key MSK CA . OASetup(GPP, P CA ) ! (P OA , MSK OA ): The OA setup algorithm, takes in global public parameters GPP, public key P CA of CA, and outputs the public key P OA of OA and OA' secret key MSK OA . USignKeyGen(GPP) ! (x U , P U ): The user signverify key generation algorithm, takes in GPP, and outputs secret sign-key x U and public verify-key P U . UDecryptKeyGen(GPP, MSK CA , MSK OA , S, x U , P U , P CA ) ! SK U , S : The user decryption key generation algorithm is accomplished by user, CA and OA in sequence. A user generates a signature L for a random using sign-key x U , and submits an identity U and attributes S along with signature L to CA. CA verifies the signature L and generates an intermediate decryption key SK U , S 0 with MSK CA . A part of SK U , S 0 is secretly sent to U and the other part of SK U , S 0 is secretly sent to OA. Then, OA generates the decryption key SK U , S with its secret key MSK OA . Encrypt(P CA , P OA , W, M) ! CT W : The encryption algorithm, takes in P CA and P OA , a plaintext M, and an access structure W over U and outputs a ciphertext CT W .
The decryption algorithm, takes in P CA and P OA , decryption key SK U , S , a ciphertext CT W , and the access structure W, outputs plaintext M, or a failure symbol ?.
IND-s-CPA security
There are two authorities CA and OA. We assume that CA and OA are curious-but-honest, and CA is not allowed to collude with OA. The ciphertext indistinguishability under adaptive chosen plaintext attack in the selective model (IND-s-CPA) of accountable CP-ABE is described by following security game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Init: A submits a target access structure W Ã , r where W Ã is an l Ã 3 k Ã matrix. Setup: C runs the GlobalSetup, CASetup, and OASetup algorithms and sends public parameters to A. If the adversary A is CA (OA), C runs the GlobalSetup, and CASetup (OASetup) algorithms, the public key of CA (OA) is given by A, that is, the CA and OA are curious-but-honest. Phase 1: A queries the challenger C for secret signkey corresponding to a series of honest identities U . If identity U is colluded, A directly submits the public verify-key to C. And A queries the challenger C for decryption secret key corresponding to sets of identities U and attributes S. 
Accountability
The accountability in tuCP-ABE scheme is based on two properties: the white-box traceability and the nonrepudiation of user's signature.
White-box traceability. The identity information is related to a decryption key by the signature of CA and OA. Thus, the white-box traceability game is similar to the unforgeability of signature. It can be described by following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup: C runs the GlobalSetup, CASetup, and OASetup algorithms and sends public parameters to A. If the adversary A is CA (OA), C runs the GlobalSetup, CASetup (OASetup) algorithms, and the public key of CA (OA) is given by A. Query phase: A queries the challenger C for secret sign-key corresponding to a series of honest identities U . If identity U is colluded, A directly submits the public verify-key to C, and A queries the challenger C for decryption secret key corresponding to sets of identities U and attributes S. Forge: At last, A outputs a decryption key SK U Ã , S Ã for (U Ã , S Ã ). The adversary A wins the game if SK U Ã , S Ã is valid and SK U Ã , S Ã is not from a decryption key query on (U Ã , S Ã ). The advantage of A is defined as Adv(A) = Pr½Awins.
Non-repudiation of user. The non-repudiation of user is based on the unforgeability of the user's signature, and we assume that at one period, a user has a unique random that relates to decryption key. The nonrepudiation of user is defined by the following game between an adversary A and a challenger C.
Setup: C runs the GlobalSetup algorithms and sends public parameters to A. The adversary A sends the public keys of CA and OA to C. Query phase: A queries the challenger C for secret sign-key corresponding to a series of honest identities U . If identity U is colluded, A directly submits the public verify-key to C. Forge: At last, A outputs a decryption key SK U Ã , S Ã for (U Ã , S Ã ). The adversary A wins the game if SK U Ã , S Ã is valid, and the one-time random of SK U Ã , S Ã is the same with a real SK
The concrete tuCP-ABE scheme GlobalSetup(l) ! (GPP): Given a security parameter l, it generates two cyclic groups G, G T of prime-order p, two random generators g, g 1 of G, a bilinear map e : G 3 G ! G T . For each attribute att i 2 U, it randomly chooses t i 2 R Z p , sets T i = g t i , generates two secure Hash functions , keeps (b, b) as OA' secret key MSK OA , publishes e(g, g)
Each user needs to generate a pair of keys to sign a signature. User U selects a random element x U 2 Z p as signature secret key, publishes P U = g x U as public key.
) of user U with attribute set S can be generated as follows:
1 , where h 1 = H 1 (r U , P U , IDinfo), and sends (r U , L, P U , IDinfo, S) to CA. -CA verifies the correctness of L by e(L, g) = e(h 1 , P U ), where
an item is found, CA requests another random r U . Else, it stores (r U , L, P U , IDinfo, S, h 2 ), where
Then, CA sends (r U , L, P U , IDinfo, S,K,K 0 ,K 00 , K 000 , fK i g att i 2S ) to OA and u to U secretly.
-OA randomly chooses s 2 2 R Z p , computes
Encrypt(GPP, P CA , P OA , W, M) ! CT W : Given a plaintext M and an access structure (W, r),
can be generated as follows: -Chooses a random vectorṽ = (r, y 2 , . . . , y k ) 2 R (Z p ) k and random elements r 1 , . . . , r l 2 R Z p ; -Computes C 0 = g r , C 00 = g br , C = M(e(g, g)
, where index set I = fi : att r(i) 2 S 0 g. If attributes set S 0 satisfies the access structure (W, r) the user U retrieves the message as follows
) passes the key sanity check if
If SK U , S passes the key sanity check, it outputs 1; else outputs 0.
If SK U , S passes the key sanity check, CA (OA) finds (r U , L, P U , IDinfo, S) in list L CA (L OA ), and verifies
e(L, g) = e(h 1 , P U ), where h 1 = H 1 (r U , P U , IDinfo). If they hold, it outputs the identity information IDinfo of SK U , S .
Note that a malicious user may mask the secret key as (
) to mask its identity. The CA (OA) can trace the identity of a shared key by checking K
for all r 0 u in the system, where only jUj exponent computation is needed. In scheme by Yu et al., 22 a malicious user may share (K u=h , (K 0 ) u=h , f(K i ) u=h : 8att i 2 Sg) to mask its identity. The CA (OA) who records the U , s, and u can trace the identity by checking e(g, K u=h ) = e(g, K) u=h for all U , s, and u in the system, which is higher overhead to compute 2jUj bilinear maps for all users U 2 U.
Suppose a shared key SK U , S is related to user U (with identity IDinfo) by the trace algorithm, but user U claims to be innocent and framed by the system. To prove its innocence, U submits (r U , h 2 , K, K 0 ) to the auditor while r U , h 2 is the same with that of SK U , S and K, K 0 is different from SK U, S . Then the auditor checks whether e(K 0 , g b g r U ) = e(g, g)
, K) holds or not. If it does, the auditor will rule that the user is innocent because of the one-time random r U ; else, outputs IDinfo.
Security and performance analysis
IND-CPA security
The confidentiality (IND-CPA security) of the proposed scheme can be presented directly based on the (decision) q parallel-BDHE assumption. We denote the CP-ABE scheme by Waters 8 as WCP-ABE. For simplicity, we will reduce the security of the proposed scheme to that of WCP-ABE scheme. Proof. The details of proof are referred to Waters. 8 Lemma 2. If CA and OA are regarded as one authority, then the confidentiality of the proposed tuCP-ABE scheme can be reduced to that of WCP-ABE scheme.
Proof. If CA and OA are regarded as one authority, then CA (for example) runs the OASetup algorithm and gets the secret key of OA. And the UDecryptKeyGen algorithm is as follows:
1 , where h 1 = H 1 (r U , P U , IDinfo) and sends (r U , L, P U , IDinfo, S) to CA. 2. CA verifies the correctness of L by e(L, g) = e(h 1 , P U ), where 
If there is an adversary A that can break the tuCP-ABE scheme with advantage Adv A , we can construct an adversary B against WCP-ABE 8 with advantage Adv B such that Adv B = Adv A . The construction is as follows, where C simulates the queries both from A and B.
Setup: C gives B the WCP-ABE public parameters p, G, G T , e, g, e(g, g)
to A as the tuCP-ABE public parameters, which implicitly sets a 1 = a 2 = a 3 = a.
Phase 1: A submits a set of attributes set S & U with identity U for UdecryptGen oracle.
by running the KeyGen algorithm (or a KeyGen oracle queried by B) of WCP-ABE. Then,
, and returns
Challenge: A submits two messages M 0 , M 1 of equal length along with target access structure W Ã , C flips a random coin b 2 f0, 1g and generates the tuCP-ABE challenge ciphertext Proof. Here we give a heuristic analysis. A curious-buthonest CA needs to get b (1) or r (2) to decrypt cophertext M(e(g, g)
However, it is related to DL to compute b or r. Under the DL assumption, the OA cannot decrypt any ciphertext.
Lemma 4. A curious-but-honest OA (without collusion with CA and a valid key from user) cannot decrypt any ciphertext.
Proof. If OA is curious-but-honest, CA needs to recover u to recover cophertext. However, it is also related to DL to compute u. Under the DL assumption, the CA cannot decrypt any ciphertext. Lemma 5. If the lÀSDH assumption holds, the tuCP-ABE is white-box traceability, that is, a user cannot generate a forge secret key.
Proof. Actually, the
can be seen as signature signed by CA and OA in sequence. Concretely, CA signs a short signature 29 g a 1 =(b + r u ) and g a 3 =(b + h 2 ) of r u , h 2 with signsecret key (a 1 , b), (a 3 , b) correspondingly, then OA signs a short signature 30 (g
with secret key b. If the lÀSDH assumption and DL assumption hold, the short signature schemes by Boneh and colleagues 29, 30 are secure against existential forgery under chosen message attack. 29, 30 Thus, the tuCP-ABE is full white-box traceability, that is, a valid secret key is really related to r u , h 2 , because a user cannot generate a forge secret key. Theorem 2. If the lÀSDH and CDH assumption hold, the tuCP-ABE is accountability.
Proof. On one hand, from Lemma 5, the tuCP-ABE scheme is white-box traceability. On the other hand, the one-time random r u is signed by user using a short signature schemein Boneh et al. 30 The CA and OA cannot generate a secret key for a random r 0 u without the user's signature. Thus, at some period, the secret key including r u is the only one valid secret key. Thus the tuCP-ABE is accountability.
Experimental results
Obviously, to achieve traceability and accountability the user secret key generation algorithm of the proposed tuCP-ABE scheme is more complicated than the pure CP-ABE scheme proposed by Waters. 8 However, it is more practical than the key generation algorithm of scheme by Yu et al. 22 Similar to scheme by Waters, 8 the time cost of encrypt algorithm is linear to the number of attributes evolved in an access structure, and the time cost of decrypt algorithm is linear to the number of attributes related to decryption key.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed tuCP-ABE scheme, we implement the tuCP-ABE scheme in java with the JPBC library and run the experiments on a Win 10 system equipped with a dual-core Intel CPU and 8 GB RAM. In an ABE system, the computational cost depends on the complexity of access policy. To illustrate this, we simulate the worst case that the access policy in the form of (A 1 and A 2 ... and A n ), where A i denotes an attribute.
Figure 1(a) and (b) illustrate the time cost for encrypt, decrypt phases of our tuCP-ABE and the CP-ABE proposed by Waters. 8 As shown in Figure 1 , the time consumption for encrypt and decrypt of the proposed tuCP-ABE scheme is comparable to the practical CP-ABE scheme proposed by Waters. 8 
Conclusion
In this article, we propose a CP-ABE scheme, called tuCP-ABE, which supports traceability and accountability. In the tuCP-ABE system, the identity related to a shared secret key can be traced, furthermore an auditor can publicly judge whether the traced identity is innocent or not. We also prove that the tuCP-ABE scheme is selectively secure in the standard model and give some experimental results.
Note that a user is willing to mask the decryption key before sharing. Although the complexity of tracing a masked secret key in our tuCP-ABE is reduced from 2jUj bilinear maps of scheme in Yu et al. 22 to jUj exponent computation, it is still a troublesome work when there are many users in the system. Furthermore, there exists a stronger way of masking the key; a malicious user may share a decryption device while the decryption key and the decryption algorithm can be hidden. In this case, the proposed tuCP-ABE scheme which only can support white-box traceability will fail. However, black-box traceable CP-ABE usually has lower encryption and decryption efficiency. Thus, constructing white-box traceable CP-ABE scheme that supports efficient traceability of a masked decryption key, and constructing efficient CP-ABE support blackbox traceability and public auditing are two interesting open problems.
